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WHO IS A FAMILY: COHABITATION,
MARRIAGE, AND THE REDEFINITION OF
FAMILY
Andrew Morrison
The emergence of cohabitation as an alternative to the traditional
form of the family has left the need for legislative reform. Currently,
cohabitants must resort to equitable claims as they do not have
access to the property sharing regime designated for married
spouses. The definition of “family” requires reformulation to include
cohabitation. This reformulation must then be reflected in Ontario’s
Family Law Act through the adoption of an opt-out regime. This
reform appropriately balances the values of autonomy and equality
and creates certainty, predictability, and consistency in the law of
Ontario. This paper addresses the possibility of reform through the
discussion of family law policy.
INTRODUCTION
Have you ever been told that whom you choose to marry is one of the
most important decisions you will have to make? Marriage in Ontario
continues to enjoy a “uniquely privileged status.”1 That is, by choosing
to marry, an individual acquires specific legal rights and obligations.2
The social perception of what constitutes a “family” has changed over
the past fifty years as there has been a consistent rise in the rate of
cohabitation. “Cohabitation,” for the purposes of this paper, is defined
as an intimate relationship involving two persons living together
without being legally married. Some provinces, including Nova Scotia
and, more recently, British Columbia, have adopted legislation to

1

Winifred Holland, “Intimate Relationships in the New Millennium: The
Assimilation of Marriage and Cohabitation” (2000) 17:1 Can J Fam L 114 at
125.

2

Ibid at 121.
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reflect the changing structure of the family. Complete reform in
Ontario, however, has yet to occur. The family should be redefined in
Ontario to include cohabiting families, which may or may not involve
children. This redefinition of family ought to be reflected in family
policy and the Family Law Act3 by adopting an opt-out regime similar
to that adopted most recently in British Columbia.
Marriage was the only legally recognized family form in the
1960s.4 Cohabitants were excluded from the rights and obligations that
attached automatically upon marriage.5 The exclusivity of particular
legal rights and obligations within the area of family law has been, and
continues to be, a source of frustration for “non-normative” family
arrangements.6 Courts, especially in Ontario, have been slow to extend
legal recognition to cohabiting couples. Prior to the transformation of
the institution of marriage, same-sex couples found it incredibly
difficult to “assert the legitimacy of their families.”7 Although not the
focus of this paper, this issue was clearly demonstrated by the difficulty
same-sex partners faced when arguing for automatic parental status in
terms of entitlement to birth registration.8
Over the past fifty years, legal scholars and policymakers have
attempted to tackle the issue of extending the rights and obligations

3

RSO 1990, c F-3 [OFLA].

4

Supra note 1 at para 127.

5

Ibid.

6

Fiona Kelly, Transforming Law’s Family: The Legal Recognition of Planned
Lesbian Motherhood (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011).

7

Ibid at 29.

8

Mary Jane Mossman, Families and the Law: Cases and Commentary
(Concord: Captus Press Inc, 2012) [Mossman, Commentary].
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associated with marriage to cohabitation.9 In Ontario, many of these
rights and obligations are still unique to married spouses, but support
obligations under the Family Law Act have been imposed on
cohabitants.10 Policymakers have shifted the financial burden from the
State to the family, a theme that recurs throughout family law
legislation. Unfortunately, the definition of “spouse” for the purposes
of property rights has not yet been extended to include cohabitants in
Ontario. Cohabitants must resort to equitable claims, an area of law
that is complex and lacks certainty. It is in this sense that these
equitable claims have “serious limitations as a tool for the fair
allocation of property between cohabiting spouses.”11
The functional similarity between marriage and cohabitation is
one of the main pillars supporting the argument for legislative reform.
According to some scholars, the difference between marriage and
cohabitation is minimal.12 Marriage and cohabitation encompass “a
range of relationships, some characterized by various forms of
dependency, while others involve spouses who are quite independent,
financially and otherwise.”13 In fact, similar needs arise for cohabitants
and married spouses upon the breakdown of their respective
relationships (i.e. support).
The definition of family has been historically synonymous
with marriage. This view of the family is inherently flawed. When one
considers who is a family, marriage ought not to be a necessary
condition. The definition of the family should focus on what families

9

Holland, supra note 1; Zheng Wu, Cohabitation: An Alternative Form of
Family Living (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2000).

10

OFLA supra note 3, s 29.

11

Ontario Law Reform Commission (OLRC), Report on Family Property Law
(Toronto: OLRC, 1993) at 39 40, [OLRC, Family Property Law].

12

Holland, supra note 1; OLRC, Family Property Law, supra note 11.

13

Holland, supra note 1 at 151.

384

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 29, 2015]

do as opposed to what they look like. The family, or more specifically
the nuclear family, is often referred to as the basic social unit. The
nuclear family cannot be said to require marriage, as it is defined as
being composed of two parents and their children. Cohabitation and
marriage, therefore, are simply different forms of the nuclear family.
As such, there is a need for legislative reform to recognize the
variations of the nuclear family.
The Ontario legislative regime currently does not recognize
the contribution made by cohabitants to their families as it does through
the redistribution of economic resources upon the dissolution of a
marriage. According to Justice L’Heureux-Dubé,
Cohabitation is slowly but surely becoming a substitute
for legal marriage as a social institution where children
are born, raised, and socialized to become members of
our society.14
It follows from this reasoning that cohabitation poses a greater threat
to the institution of marriage than the high incidence of divorce.15 This
is because while both undermine the permanence of marriage, only
cohabitation can provide an alternative to marriage.16 That is, as noted
earlier, cohabitation is simply a variation of what many view as the
traditional nuclear family. If cohabitation is viewed as an alternative to
marriage, or, rather, a different form of the nuclear family, as opposed
to a precursor to marriage (i.e. “trial marriage”), then the extension of
the legislative regime to cohabiting couples is required to protect the
vulnerable people in such relationships.

14

Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v Walsh, 2002 SCC 83 at para 125, 221 DLR
(4th) 1 [Walsh].

15

Wu, supra note 9 at 4.

16

Ibid.
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This paper aims to discuss cohabitation with a view towards
the possibility of legislative reform in Ontario. First, statistics
respecting cohabitation will confirm familial trends in Canadian
society and provide a more accurate understanding of who exactly
chooses to cohabit. Second, the factors that influence an individual’s
choice to cohabit will be explored. These factors will provide the
framework to discuss policy rationales for extending rights and
obligations of married spouses to cohabitants. Third, the current
legislative scheme in Ontario as set out in the Family Law Act and the
issues associated with this scheme will be reviewed. Fourth, possible
resolutions will be proposed by focusing on alternative legislative
schemes adopted in other provinces. After consideration of all the
above, this paper will advocate for the adoption of an opt-out approach
similar to that adopted in British Columbia. It is important to note that
the terms “cohabitation” and “common-law” will be used
interchangeably for the purposes of this paper.
WHO CHOOSES TO COHABIT: STATISTICS AND TRENDS
General Statistics
Approximately 16.7 per cent of all census families in Canada were
common-law couples in 2011.17 In comparison, common-law couples
composed only 5.6 per cent of all census families in Canada in 1981
and 13.8 per cent in 2001.18 The percentage of cohabiting couples has
increased at least three-fold since Statistics Canada began gathering
data in 1981 with respect to cohabitation/common-law unions.19 This

17

Statistics Canada, Portrait of Families and Living Arrangements in Canada,
Catalogue No 98-312—X201101 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, September
2012) at 5 [Statistics Canada, Portrait of Families].

18

Ibid.

19

Statistics Canada, Fifty Years of Families in Canada: 1961 2011, by Anne
Milan & Nora Bohnert, Catalogue No 98-312-X2011003 (Ottawa: Statistics
Canada, September 2012) at 2 [Statistics Canada, Fifty Years].
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trend signifies that the conception of the modern family ought to
include cohabiting couples, as these unions are increasingly becoming
an alternative to marriage, the traditional form of the family.
The rate of cohabitation varies across Canada’s ten provinces
and three territories.20 Quebec has the highest rate of cohabitation
relative to Canada’s nine other provinces. In 2011, 31.5 per cent of all
census families in Quebec were common-law couples.21 The lowest
rate of cohabitation, 10.9 per cent, was found in Ontario.22 The great
discrepancy between the rate of cohabitation in Quebec and the other
nine provinces is often explained by the differences in values between
Quebec and the English provinces.23 In fact, the regional patterns
among Canada’s English provinces are less salient as there is only a
3.3 per cent deviation among the provinces with respect to the rate of
cohabitation.24
The rate of cohabitation is considerably higher in Canada’s
three territories—Nunavut (32.7 per cent), Northwest Territories (28.7
per cent) and Yukon (25.1 per cent)—in comparison to the English
provinces.25 When interpreting these statistics, however, it is important
to take into consideration that “the population base in the territories is
relatively small.”26 Nonetheless, cohabitation seems to be a “popular
lifestyle choice among Canada’s indigenous populations.”27

20

Supra note 17 at 6.

21

Ibid.

22

Ibid.

23

Wu, supra note 9 at 48.

24

Statistics Canada, Fifty Years, supra note 19 at 6.

25

Ibid.

26

Wu, supra note 9 at 47.

27
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Who Cohabits?
The regional patterns with respect to cohabitation reveal significant
differences in Canadian society. First, it is apparent that cohabitation
is more prevalent among Aboriginal people. Second, those residing in
Quebec are also more open to cohabit in comparison to individuals in
Canada’s English provinces. Past these broad generalizations,
however, it is important to further explore which segments of the
population are more open to and have higher rates of cohabitation.
First, cohabitation is particularly prevalent among Canadians
in their twenties and thirties.28 Economic factors may play a significant
role in the decision to cohabit during this period of time. In addition,
some scholars suggest that the prevalence of cohabitation among those
in their twenties and thirties can be partially explained by the fact that
cohabitation is a precursor to marriage.29 That is, cohabitation is
viewed by these young adults as a “trial marriage” as opposed to an
alternative to marriage.30 This interpretation is supported by the fact
that more than two-thirds of cohabitees have never been previously
married.31
Second, “common-law relationships are also increasingly
popular among people who enter a second union.”32 Over 25 per cent
of cohabitants have been previously divorced.33 In fact,

28

Ibid at 1.

29

Holland, supra note 1 at 159.

30

Ibid.

31

Wu, supra note 9 at 1.

32

Berend Hovius, “Property Division for Unmarried Cohabitees in the Common
Law Provinces” (2003) 21 Can Fam LQ 175 at 175.

33

Wu, supra note 9 at 1.
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while Statistics Canada estimated that barely 8 per cent
of women ranging in age
from 50 to 59 had chosen
a common-law relationship as their first union,
approximately 20 per cent of them had been or would
eventually be involved in a common-law relationship.34
It follows that there are at least two entirely different segments of the
population who choose to cohabit. These groups may have different
values when entering into these new relationships given their past
experiences or lack thereof.
Third, approximately half of cohabiting unions include
children, “either born to the cohabiting couple or brought into the
family from previous relationships.”35 The rise in non-marital fertility
and the decline in teen fertility are consistent with the theory that much
of the “increase in non-marital fertility in recent decades may have
been largely a consequence of the increase in non-marital
cohabitation.”36 The presence of children in a cohabiting relationship
adds a different dimension to this discussion because another party
must be considered upon the breakdown of that relationship.
Furthermore, if a child is brought into a cohabiting union from a
previous relationship, the relationship may become structured in a
particular manner that protects the child’s interests.
The above characteristics provide a general framework to
discuss policy issues with a view toward legislative reform. There are
other characteristics that may have a lesser impact on this discussion
but remain significant. Studies have shown that men are more willing
than women to consider cohabitation as a viable alternative to

34

Hovius, supra note 32 at 175.

35

Wu, supra note 9 at 1.

36

Ibid at 88.
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marriage.37 In addition, higher levels of education and labour force
participation are positively correlated with one’s willingness to
consider cohabitation.38 These additional characteristics are relevant to
policy issues such as autonomy, equality, and the protection of the
vulnerable.
When considering the possibility of reform, it is crucial to take
into consideration those affected by the reform and analyze the effect
of such reform on these groups of individuals. It is clear from the above
that there are two distinct groups of cohabitees that will be affected by
legislative reform—those who have not been previously married
(never-married cohabitants), and those who have been previously
married (post-marital cohabitants). In addition, it is crucial to take into
consideration whether there are children involved in the relationship
and whether they are brought into the relationship or born to the
cohabiting couple.
Breakdown of the Relationship
“Cohabitations are often short-lived.”39 In fact, over half of cohabiting
relationships end within three years.40 This, however, may be
misinterpreted if the reasons for ending the cohabiting relationship are
not considered. A cohabiting relationship may end due to separation,
death of one of the cohabitees, or marriage. In fact,
these unions are more likely to end in marriage than in
separation: about one-third of cohabiting couples marry
each other within three years of cohabitation, while

37

Anne Milan, “Would You Live Common Law”, Canadian Social Trends (9
September 2003) 2 at 2.

38

Ibid at 3.

39

Wu, supra note 9 at 1.

40

Ibid.
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another quarter dissolve their relationships through
separation.41
These statistics have caused legal scholars to debate the meaning of
cohabiting relationships. One position is that cohabitation is a
precursor to marriage or a “trial marriage.” The other position taken by
legal academics is that cohabitation is a substitute for marriage. It
follows from this latter position that those who choose to cohabit are
fundamentally different from those who choose to marry.
There is evidence supporting each position, but the second
position is more troubling legislatively. If two persons form a
cohabiting relationship, one may wish to marry while the other does
not. This power imbalance is not equalized by the current legislative
regime in Ontario as the vulnerable cohabitee (the one who wishes to
marry) is left unprotected by legislation. If both cohabitees see their
union as a substitute to marriage, they are in a better position to
structure their relationship accordingly, with the knowledge that they
do not have the same rights and obligations as married spouses.
Wu points out that “[t]here is no doubt that cohabiting unions
are more vulnerable and less stable than marital unions.”42 Given the
fact that approximately 25 per cent of cohabiting relationships dissolve
through separation within three years, the legal rights and obligations
of cohabitees are increasingly significant. “Almost 90 per cent of first
marriages last at least ten years, while only 12 per cent of common law
relationships achieve a tenth anniversary.”43 The rise in cohabitation in
combination with the above facts means that an increasing proportion
of the population are left with little certainty upon the breakdown of
their relationships.

41

Ibid.

42

Ibid at 108.

43

Hovius, supra note 32 at 176.
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The three-year mark in a cohabiting relationship can be said to
be the defining point in the relationship. Approximately 60 per cent of
cohabiting relationships have ended through separation or marriage by
this point in time.44 Thus, policymakers ought to keep this timeframe
in mind when creating an opt-out regime whereby legal rights and
obligations automatically attach to cohabitees at a particular point in
their relationship.
WHY CHOOSE TO COHABIT: THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES
The emergence of cohabitation as a form of family living has led many
academics to theorize about why this has occurred. Changing public
attitudes and values with respect to premarital sex and the social
institution of marriage are a contributing factor to this change in the
modern family.45 Changing gender roles may have also contributed to
the rise of cohabitation over the past thirty years.46 The successful
challenge to the opposite-sex requirement with respect to the validity
of marriage may have slowed the process of extending legal rights and
obligations associated with marriage to those who choose to cohabit,
as same-sex couples are no longer limited to cohabitation. The
following discussion outlines different perspectives on the rise of
cohabitation. It is critical to understand the rise of cohabitation in
Canadian society to determine whether these families ought to have the
same rights and obligations as married spouses.
Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Economic Perspective on Cohabitation
Individuals are “faced with the necessity to make choices; and in
making choices, they try as best they can to maximize welfare as they

44

Wu, supra note 9 at 1.

45

Ibid at 2.

46

Ibid.
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conceive it.”47 That is, these choices are made to maximize current and
future benefits. This means that individuals attempt to “anticipate the
uncertain consequences of their choices.”48 It is suggested by
economists such as Gary Becker that individuals choose to marry only
if they will gain from marriage.49 Traditionally, individuals who chose
to marry would have a two-fold benefit—at home and in the labour
market.
Societal norms, attitudes, and values are constantly changing.
Although gender barriers still exist within the labour market, these
barriers are not as great as they once were. Gender roles have changed
drastically, and such change can be traced back to World War II. In
fact, women’s economic independence has reduced the necessity of
marriage:
Increases in women’s earning power and participation
in the labour market would discourage individuals,
particularly women, from entering into marriage
because of reduced economic gain from the union.50
Cohabitation is an attractive alternative to marriage for those who seek
to be partnered with another but wish to pursue their careers. It offers
individuals the benefits of marriage, such as the pooling of resources
and the sharing of residence, with less commitment.
Implicit in this theoretical perspective is the notion that
individuals are consciously choosing to avoid the social institution of

47

Ibid at 10.

48

Ibid.

49

Gary Becker, “A Theory of Marriage” in Theodore W Schulz, ed,
Economics of the Family: Marriage, Children, and Human Capital
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974) 299, online: The National
Bureau of Economic Research <www.nber.org/chapters/c2970.pdf>.

50

Wu, supra note 9 at 13.
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marriage and the legal consequences that flow from it. That is, they are
actively avoiding long-term commitment and the legislative provisions
that require the sharing of the “fruits of the relationship, which are the
result of joint efforts during the relationship.”51 The question then
becomes whether both parties are actively choosing not to marry. The
Family Law Act must create a fair compromise that both allows
individuals to structure their relationships to fall within or outside its
scope and to protect a vulnerable party from being exploited by the
other.
Changing Societal Norms and Values: The Sociological
Perspective
The sociological perspective takes a more macro-level approach with
respect to the family. According to this perspective, norms, values, and
beliefs play a significant role in regulating social behaviour.52 These
norms, values, and beliefs do not remain static, as they adapt to various
social and structural changes within society.53
Marriage and cohabitation are social behaviours to
which socially defined values are attached. Thus, the
values and norms concerning union behaviour may vary
across cultures and historical periods.54
This variance across cultures is demonstrated by the aforementioned
difference in the rate of cohabitation between Quebec and the English
provinces. However, this difference does not explain the general
emergence of cohabitation as a form of family living.

51

Holland, supra note 1 at 151.

52

Wu, supra note 9 at 20.

53

Ibid at 16.

54

Ibid.
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Over the past fifty years there has been a significant
ideological shift in Western societies that is often referred to as the rise
of individualism.55 This shift has “gradually shifted the norms from
family-centred orientations to relatively more self-oriented pursuits.”56
These changes have significantly contributed to the changes in the
traditional form of the family. Cohabitation offers those in search of
“self-fulfillment” a less permanent and committed relationship, while
still offering some of the benefits of marriage, such as the pooling of
resources and the sharing of a residence.
This perspective seems to advance the position against reform.
That is, if those who enter cohabiting relationships do so to further
themselves while avoiding the legal rights and obligations that
automatically attach upon marriage, then the autonomy of cohabitees
ought to be respected. However, it is neither fair nor responsible to
generalize to all cohabitants. In fact, many individuals believe that
cohabitation offers the same legal protection as marriage after a certain
period of time. If the intention of the cohabitees is to form a family,
then there ought to be no difference between marriage and cohabitation
after the three-year mark. If this is not their intention, one may argue
that the onus must be placed on the party attempting to avoid inclusion
in the legislative regime—an opt-out approach.
THE CURRENT REGIME IN ONTARIO: THE FAMILY LAW
ACT
The Two Definitions of “Spouse”
Ontario’s Family Law Act provides two separate definitions of
“spouse.” The first, which I will refer to as the “standard definition,”
excludes cohabiting individuals.57 The second, which I will refer to as

55

Ibid at 17.

56

Ibid.

57

OFLA, supra note 3, s 1(1).
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the “expanded definition,” includes both married individuals and those
who have cohabited “continuously for a period of not less than three
years” or “are in a relationship of some permanence, if they are the
natural or adoptive parents of a child.”58
The standard definition of “spouse” is largely self-explanatory.
In contrast, case law is required to interpret the expanded definition.
First, the term “continuously” has been interpreted by the court
flexibly. It is not only a question of geography but a question of
intent.59 One of the cohabitees must intend to permanently sever the
relationship or the court may interpret the relationship as one with
some degree of continuity.60 Second, “of some permanence” has also
been interpreted flexibly by the courts. The court held in Hazlewood v.
Kent:
One of the strongest indicia of an intention to be treated
as a family is the existence of children born to the
couple. When this is combined with an element of
financial support by one party to the other, an altering
of the roles in the relationship as a result of the birth of
the children and some time spent together on a regular
basis, this relationship should be considered to be
‘cohabitation.’61
It is clear that the legislature and courts attempt to cast a wide net with
respect to the expanded definition of “spouse.”

58

Ibid, s 29.

59

Sullivan v Letnik, 5 RFL (4th) 313, 1994 CarswellOnt 420 (Ont UFC) at para
24.

60

Ibid.

61

Hazlewood v Kent, [2000] OJ No 5263 (Sup Ct J) at para 38, [Hazlewood].
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When Are the Definitions Applicable: Support Obligations and
the Exclusion of Cohabiting Couples from the Property Sharing
Regime
The standard definition of “spouse” is used for the entirety of the Act
except for Part III, support obligations. Thus, those who cohabit will
fall within the scope of Part III of the Act if they have either cohabited
continuously for at least three years or are in a relationship of some
permanence and have children. Cohabitees do not have access to the
property sharing regime that is available to married spouses upon the
breakdown of their relationship or the rights to possession of the
matrimonial home. Ontario’s Family Law Act, in its current form,
forces the financially vulnerable party to resort to equitable claims
upon the breakdown of their relationship. Thus, Ontario adopts an optin approach as cohabiting couples may enter into a cohabitation
agreement that addresses all the issues that would otherwise be
addressed if married.
RATIONALIZING THE TWO DEFINITIONS OF “SPOUSE”:
HIDDEN POLICIES
The use of two distinctly different definitions of “spouse” within the
same Act is complex and may be confusing to cohabiting couples. On
the one hand, policymakers are claiming that cohabitees and married
spouses are equivalent, at least for the purposes of support obligations.
On the other hand, policymakers differentiate between married spouses
and cohabitees for all other purposes, including property sharing. The
State’s financial interest at stake in this decision plays a decisive role
in these different definitions. The rationale that underlies the use of the
expanded definition for support obligations is two-fold. First, and
foremost, the State places the financial burden of ongoing support on
former family members as opposed to the “public purse.” Second, the
State protects the more vulnerable party of the cohabiting relationship
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from exploitation by entitling them to support, if they meet the criteria
as set out in the Act.62
It is the first of these rationales, the State’s financial interests,
that is more disconcerting. The legislature prefers to place the financial
obligation for support on former family members as opposed to the
State. This desire to lessen the pull on the public’s purse strings is often
referred to as a “hidden policy,” as it often falls outside the articulated
reasoning behind legislative decisions. In Nova Scotia (Attorney
General) v. Walsh, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé identifies the “desire to
avoid diverting funds from the public purse in order to support
separated individuals.”63 As a consequence, former family members
often have “significant ongoing responsibilities to alleviate
vulnerability among some family members after separation.”64
The ongoing responsibility to alleviate economic vulnerability
of former family members ensures that contact between former family
members is maintained. This ongoing responsibility to former family
members has led to the “post-separation” family.65 The statistics
regarding the post-separation family are alarming. In fact,
. . . the end of a marriage or common-law relationship
increased the likelihood of poverty substantially. For
those who were married and had children, the risk of
poverty rose from 3.1 per cent to 37.6 per cent after
divorce or separation. . . . In 1982 86, the family
income of women (adjusted for changes in family size)

62

OFLA, supra note 3, s 29.

63

Supra note 14 at para 116.

64

Mossman, Commentary, supra note 8 at 339.

65

Ibid.
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dropped by an average of about 30 per cent in the year
after their marriage ended.66
These financially vulnerable family members emerge after separation,
as one household has now been split into two and the cost of living
nearly doubles. The dependency, which was once hidden under the
cover of an intact family, emerges upon the dissolution of the family
unit.67 “Separation or divorce thus ‘unmasks’ the dependency for
which intact families provide support.”68
The use of the expanded definition of “spouse” for the
purposes of Part III of the Family Law Act thereby expands the number
of “post-separation” family units. The question is whether the policy
decision to place the burden so heavily on the family is justified. This
is the point at which the distinction in legislation between cohabitants
and married spouses becomes questionable. That is, if cohabitants and
married spouses are equivalent with respect to support obligations, it is
difficult to justify the differentiation when it comes to other sections of
the Act, particularly property. Put simply, if cohabitants are
functionally similar to married spouses for the purposes of support,
then they must be considered functionally similar for all purposes.
THE MARRIAGE-COHABITATION DEBATE: THEMES,
ISSUES, AND POLICY
Legal scholars have advocated for the extension of the legal regime
that deals with the economic consequences of marriage to those who
cohabit. Careful consideration must be given to the various themes,
issues, and general policies that underlie this marriage-cohabitation

66

T Lempriere, “A New Look at Poverty” (1992) 16 Perception 18 at 19 20,
cited in Mary Jane Mossman, “Running Hard to Stand Still: The Paradox of
Family Law Reform” (1994) 17 Dal LJ 5 at 6 [Mossman, “Running Hard”].

67

Mossman, Commentary, supra note 8 at 339.

68

Ibid at 338 339.
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debate. The Supreme Court of Canada has provided its divided view
on the marriage-cohabitation debate in two significant cases: Nova
Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh and, more recently, Quebec
(Attorney General) v. A.69 The division of the Court in both cases has
provided scholars with a valuable perspective on the themes and issues
that are involved in the marriage-cohabitation debate. These themes
and issues will be dealt with in turn.
Functional Similarity
Family law ought to be viewed from a functionalist perspective. That
is, policymakers must focus on what families do and take account of
the functions of families.70 This is in sharp contrast to the familialism
approach, which focuses on how families should look or behave.71 The
familialism approach has been used by courts to “preclude some
households from being regarded as ‘families’ even when their
members wish to be so defined.”72 The functionalist perspective is
proactive. It adapts to changes in the form of the family by considering
the functions performed by households that wish to be considered
“families.” By contrast, the familialist perspective is reactive and the
perception of what the family ought to look like will change only after
legislative reform.
When focusing on what families do and how they behave, it
must be concluded that cohabitation and marriage are functionally
similar. This argument only becomes more persuasive the “longer the
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cohabiting relationship lasts, especially where children are involved.”73
As noted by Kuffner,
Common-law couples often share many of the same
characteristics
as
married
couples:
shared
accommodations, pooling resources, emotional and
financial interdependence, and the raising of children.
Some cohabitants have become financially dependent
on their spouse, similar to some married spouses.
Consequently, cohabitants often suffer similar
hardships upon breakdown of such relationships.74
If cohabitation is functionally similar to marriage, it seems reasonable
that cohabitees have access to the same rights and remedies available
to married spouses upon the breakdown of their respective
relationships.
The above argument was addressed by Justice Bastarache,
speaking for the majority in Walsh. He held that although there is a
great deal of similarity between marriage and cohabitation, one cannot
ignore the heterogeneity that exists within the latter group.75 This
reasoning is flawed. Although there is considerable heterogeneity
among cohabiting individuals, a similar level of heterogeneity exists
among married spouses. Thus, it seems illogical to differentiate
between cohabitation and marriage because “[w]hen we compare
cohabitation and modern-day marriage there are few distinctions.”76
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The above-mentioned argument seems to commence its
analysis from an illogical starting point. That is, it commences its
analysis by differentiating between marriage and cohabitation, rather
than analyzing what constitutes a family. If the Court had commenced
its analysis by answering this question, the reasoning of the Court
might have been significantly different. That is, when one looks at the
family, it is the functions performed by the family that define its
existence. In order to consider the functions of the family it is important
to consider its basic form—commonly referred to as the “nuclear
family”—which is comprised of parents and their children, if any.
Marriage and cohabitation are simply variations of this basic
family unit. As such, the same rights and obligations should be
imposed on those who choose to cohabit and those who choose to
marry. The relevant question then becomes when to impose these rights
and obligations on the parties who cohabit and those who marry. This
is where the distinction between marriage and cohabitation ought to be
made. Where the community may view the date of marriage as
symbolizing the formation of a new family, there is no similar date for
a cohabiting couple. Thus, the question becomes when does the
cohabiting couple become viewed as a family. The issue of
determining when this event occurs and, therefore, when the legal
rights and obligations ought to be extended to a cohabiting couple is
explored later in this paper. The reasoning of Justice Bastarache fails
to recognize that not only is there heterogeneity among those who
cohabit and those who are married, but there is also heterogeneity
among the forms of the family, i.e., cohabitation and marriage.
Autonomy: Whose Choice Is It?
Personal autonomy is a value that underlies the equality guarantee in
section 15 of the Charter.77 Thus, courts must respect the choices
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“made by individuals in the exercise of that autonomy.”78 The Supreme
Court of Canada has emphasized the importance of personal autonomy
in both Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh and Quebec (Attorney
General) v. A. In fact, the Court has gone so far as to hold that “[w]here
the legislation has the effect of dramatically altering the legal
obligations of partners, as between themselves, choice must be
paramount.”79
The Supreme Court of Canada has taken the position that those
who choose to marry are simultaneously deciding to adopt the legal
rights and obligations associated with marriage.80 To cast the net so
wide as to capture individuals who do not make this conscious choice
and impose the same obligations on these individuals would be unfair.
It “would be to intrude into the most personal and intimate of life
choices by imposing a system of obligations on people who never
consented to such a system.”81
The above reasoning of the Court, in my opinion, is flawed in
one respect—choice in terms of the family can be paramount only if
the decision is made consciously and if it is mutual. Thus, the first
question that must be posed is whether the decision to cohabit is a
mutual decision. Furthermore, the choice must be a conscious one in
which the parties are aware of the consequences that flow from that
decision. Thus, it must also be asked whether cohabitees actually know
their legal rights.
First, the decision to cohabit is not always a mutual one. In
some circumstances, only one of the parties may wish to avoid
marriage due to the matrimonial obligations that automatically
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attach.“[I]t is dangerous to assume that this motivation applies to both
partners.”82 In this case, a power imbalance exists between the parties
and the dependent party becomes financially vulnerable. Justice Abella
in Quebec (Attorney General) v. A. notes the flaws of an opt-in regime:
A further weakness of the current opt-in system is its
failure to recognize that the choice to formally marry is
a mutual decision. One member of a couple can decide
to refuse to marry or enter a civil union and thereby
deprive the other of the benefit of needed spousal
support when the relationship ends. In her dissenting
reasons in Walsh, L’Heureux-Dubé J. observed that
“[t]his results in a situation where one of the parties to
the cohabitation relationship preserves his or her
autonomy at the expense of the other: ‘The flip side of
one person’s autonomy is often another’s
exploitation.’”83
In this case, it is up to the “legislature to intervene if it believes that the
consequences of such autonomous choices give rise to social problems
that need to be remedied.”84 Where only one party desires to avoid the
matrimonial obligations by continuing to remain in a cohabiting
relationship, a social problem arises as the vulnerable party requires
protection.
Second, “couples often . . . are mistaken about the rights of
unmarried cohabitants.”85 Many individuals are under the false
impression that they have similar rights and obligations to married
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individuals if they are in a cohabiting relationship of some duration.86
That is, they believe that as far as the law is concerned they are actually
married. “The term ‘common-law marriage’ compounds this
confusion.”87 In Quebec (Attorney General) v. A., Justice Abella
echoes these concerns as she states that those who cohabit do not
always “turn their minds to the eventuality of separation” or are
ignorant of the law that applies to them.88 Instead, many cohabitees
“will just drift along, in blissful ignorance, believing that they have
property rights, until they talk to a lawyer at the end of their
relationship and learn the harsh truth.”89
Thus, it is crucial that the legislature adopt a scheme that
protects vulnerable individuals from both their ignorance and their
exploitation. An opt-out regime will protect these individuals who do
not turn their minds to their legal rights and obligations when entering
into such a relationship. One may argue that such legislation casts too
wide a net, capturing individuals in a scheme that they did not
voluntarily accept. Implicit in this argument is the conviction that these
individuals know their legal rights and can therefore mutually opt-out.
In providing an opt-out scheme, the onus is placed on the more
powerful party. Moreover, if an opt-out scheme is adopted as the
default regime, the opportunity for exploitation is minimized.
Knowledge and Exploitation: Finding the Delicate Balance
Between Autonomy and the Need to Protect the Vulnerable
There are three situations that may occur within a cohabiting
relationship with respect to the couple’s knowledge of their legal rights
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and obligations: (1) both individuals are familiar with their legal rights
and obligations; (2) only one partner understands their legal rights and
obligations; and (3) neither partner is familiar with their legal rights
and obligations. It is important to weigh the values of autonomy and
the need to protect the weaker party within the contexts of these three
situations. A delicate balance can only be struck between these
competing values if the contexts in which the concerns arise are
addressed.
First, if both parties are familiar with the legal rights and
obligations of unmarried cohabitants, the parties may stand on equal
ground. If one party wishes to marry and the other does not, a power
imbalance will still exist. Thus, the vulnerable party will be left
unprotected unless the couple agrees to enter into a cohabitation
agreement. This scenario demonstrates the concerns regarding
exploitation. Some may contest that an individual’s choice to remain
with a partner who refuses to marry is the same as a spouse who gives
in to insistent demands for marriage.90 Policymakers, however, must
place the onus on the party who wishes to avoid such obligations. In
fact, in Quebec (Attorney General) v. A., Justice Abella found that
although the current opt-in regime may well be adequate for some
cohabiting couples who enter their relationship with “sufficient
financial security, legal information, and the deliberate intent to avoid
the consequences of a more formal union . . . their ability to exercise
freedom of choice can be equally protected under . . . an opt out”
regime.91 The vulnerable party, however, requires “presumptive
protection no less in de facto unions than in more formal ones.”92
Second, the chance of exploitation is maximized in a scenario
in which only one partner in a cohabiting relationship is familiar with
the rights and obligations of unmarried cohabitants. Placing the onus
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on the party who seeks to avoid the legal obligations by means of an
opt-out regime protects the vulnerable party and minimizes
exploitation. Autonomy ought not to be synonymous with exploitation.
One cannot stand behind the veil of autonomy to justify one’s
exploitation of the weaker party.
Third, if both parties are unaware of the rights and obligations
of unmarried cohabitants, the vulnerable party will emerge only after
the breakdown of the relationship. Scholars suggest that this scenario
may be the most common among cohabitees. This is because:
most couples do not engage in “crystal-ball” gazing at
the inception of the relationship and do not have a clear
idea which obligations they are consciously choosing to
avoid. If they did, one would expect such couples to
have entered into a domestic contract rather than risking
subsequent claims based on support or unjust
enrichment.93
Many are “not aware of the distinction between Part III of the Family
Law Act and the rights under Parts I and II until they are faced with the
breakup of the relationships.”94 The use of the standard definition of
“spouse” for Parts I and II of the Act, and the use of the expanded
definition for Part III creates this confusing distinction. The creation of
an opt-out regime would eliminate the above distinction and the use of
two definitions of “spouse” within the same Act. Adopting an opt-out
regime would decrease the amount of “public confusion about the
difference between marriage and cohabitation.”95 Furthermore, the
adoption of an opt-out regime would protect cohabitees whether they
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are “aware of their legal rights or not,” leaving cohabitees “the freedom
to choose not to be protected.”96
Complexity and Uncertainty: Cohabitees Must Resort to
Equitable Claims
Under Ontario’s Family Law Act, cohabitees do not have access to the
property-sharing regime included in Part I of the Act. Cohabitees must
resort to equitable claims for the redistribution of property after the
breakdown of their relationship. These claims of unjust enrichment are
unpredictable, creating a sense of uncertainty in the law.
It is clear that the doctrine of unjust enrichment has
serious limitations as a tool for the fair allocation of
property between cohabiting spouses. . . . The
uncertainties that have appeared in the application of the
doctrine of unjust enrichment may reflect a poor fit
between its requirements and the realities of domestic
relationships.97
These equitable claims do not provide cohabitants with an effective
alternative to the property sharing regime accorded to married spouses
under Part I of the Family Law Act.
Equitable claims in the context of cohabiting relationships is
an area of the law that continues to develop. For example, the Kerr v.
Baranow decision in 2011 established the joint family venture and
gave new direction to this area of law.98 This development may further
complicate equitable claims made by unmarried cohabitants. This
complexity increases the level of uncertainty in the law and,
consequently, fosters litigation. Given the cost of litigation, some
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cohabitees refuse to pursue what they would otherwise be entitled to if
the property sharing regime accorded to married spouses was extended
to include cohabitees.
Courts may be attempting to fill a legislative void by providing
cohabitees with a “substitute for [the] non-existence of a family law
regime for cohabitants.”99 If an opt-out approach were to be adopted in
Ontario, cohabitees would no longer have to navigate through the
complex area of equitable claims. Such reform would do away with the
current piecemeal approach and provide cohabitants with a more
comprehensive regime. Cohabitants would be able to enter and exit
relationships aware of their rights and obligations. An opt-out regime
would provide cohabitants with certainty and predictability in the law.
REFORM IN OTHER PROVINCES: THE APPROACHES
ADOPTED IN NOVA SCOTIA AND BRITISH COLUMBIA
Other provinces have been quicker to address the recent emergence of
cohabitation, as these unions are increasingly becoming an alternative
to the traditional family form. It is important to take into consideration
the approaches adopted in other provinces, such as Nova Scotia and
British Columbia, and the reasoning behind such reform. The
approaches taken in the two provinces are fundamentally different, as
Nova Scotia adopted an opt-in approach, while British Columbia chose
an opt-out approach. Each province attempts to balance the competing
goals of autonomy and equality (i.e. the protection of the vulnerable).
While autonomy is given greater emphasis in the opt-in approach taken
by Nova Scotia, the reform in British Columbia tends to emphasize the
protection of the vulnerable. It is important to note that reform in Nova
Scotia took place approximately a decade prior to the reform in British
Columbia.
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Registered Partnerships: The Approach Adopted in Nova Scotia
In Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh, Justice Bastarache makes
note of the “alternative choices and remedies” available to unmarried
cohabitants.100 He states that “these couples are also capable of
accessing all of the benefits of the MPA through the joint registration
of a domestic partnership under the LRA.”101 Part II of the Law Reform
(2000) Act, which addresses the scheme for cohabiting couples for the
purposes of property sharing, came into effect on June 4, 2001.102
Through this legislation, Nova Scotia adopted an opt-in regime
whereby an unmarried cohabiting couple could register their domestic
partnership.103 Upon registration, the cohabitants would have the same
rights and obligations as “a spouse under the Matrimonial Property
Act.”104
The adoption of an opt-in regime in the form of registered
partnerships was a step in the right direction, but it fell short of properly
recognizing “a diversity of family forms.”105 The shape of the reform
was surprising, considering the Discussion Paper and Final Report
released by the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia.106 The
Commission noted that if the government wished “to encourage and
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support family life, it must assure a basic level of fairness on the
termination of marriage and marriage-like relationships.”107 In its final
report, the Commission took the view “that the existing law regarding
cohabiting couples is neither clear nor fair, and altering the law to
provide for only optional coverage of such couples would simply
perpetuate the existing situation.”108 The Commission expressed the
notion that an opt-out approach would still respect the value of
autonomy because “if both parties in a relationship value autonomy
from legal regulation strongly and equally, they will undoubtedly
contract out of the Act.”109 In short, the Commission strongly preferred
an opt-out approach and was of the view that an opt-in approach, such
as that taken by Nova Scotia, would not resolve the issues faced by
cohabiting couples after separation.
Extending the Rights and Obligations of Married Spouses to
Unmarried Cohabitants: The Opt-out Regime of British
Columbia
Reform has more recently taken place in British Columbia with the
enactment of the Family Law Act.110 The Act, which has been in force
since March 18, 2013, adopts an opt-out approach.111 That is, the Act
defines “spouse” to include both married individuals and unmarried
cohabitants who have either lived together in a “marriage-like”
relationship for two years or who have lived together in a “marriagelike” relationship and have a child together.112 It is important to note
here that cohabitants must have lived together in a “marriage-like”
relationship for two years to fall within the scope of the provisions
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dealing with property and pension division.113 Nonetheless, this
approach “recognizes the similarities between married and unmarried
relationships” and “promotes committed family relationships
regardless of marital status.”114
First, the Civil and Family Law Policy Office recognized that
“not everyone has a choice about whether or not to marry.”115 The
example that “a couple may stay together even though one spouse
wants to marry and the other does not” is used to illustrate this point.116
An opt-out regime responds to such concerns as it presumptively
protects the vulnerable party in a relationship where there is a clear
power imbalance. Second, the standardizing of the expanded definition
of “spouse” creates “greater consistency in the treatment of unmarried
spouses in family law generally and across related laws.”117 Lastly, the
inclusion of cohabitants
in the property division scheme recognizes that the
number of common-law relationships is on the rise and
that common-law remedy of constructive trusts
inadequately protects the interests of this growing
number of unmarried spouses.118
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REFORM IN ONTARIO: THE ADOPTION OF AN OPT-OUT
REGIME
It is interesting to note that 10.9 per cent of all census families in
Ontario were common-law couples in 2011.119 Although Ontario has
the lowest rate of cohabitation among Canada’s ten provinces, this
number will continue to rise. Legislative reform is needed to address
this emerging family form. Legislation is one of the primary references
that inform how individuals structure their relationships, both in
business and in family. Thus, the question now becomes whether
Ontario should adopt an opt-in approach similar to Nova Scotia’s
scheme or an opt-out approach similar to recent reform in British
Columbia.
In 1993, the Ontario Law Reform Commission (OLRC)
released its Report on the Rights and Responsibilities of Cohabitants
under the Family Law Act.120 The OLRC “concluded that the preferred
approach was to extend the legislative regime to cohabiting couples,
requiring those who wished to avoid the legislative regime to opt
out.”121 The OLRC identified four policy rationales to support its
conclusion: (1) the functional similarity between marriage and
cohabitation; (2) “reasonable expectations of family members”; (3)
“the need to compensate economic contributions to family wellbeing”; and (4) “relationships between family law and social assistance
law.”122 The last of these rationales—relationships between family law
and social assistance law—is synonymous with the hidden policies
underlying family law decisions discussed earlier. That is, the OLRC
identifies the desire to “avoid diverting funds from the public purse in

119

Statistics Canada, Portrait of Families, supra note 17 at 6.

120

Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on the Rights and Responsibilities
of Cohabitants under the Family Law Act (Toronto: OLRC, 1993) at 27.

121

Mossman, Commentary, supra note 8 at 417.

122

Ibid.

Who is Family?

413

order to support separated individuals” as an opt-out regime would
provide significant relief for Ontario’s social assistance regime.123
In my view, an opt-out approach should be adopted, as an optin approach, similar to that adopted in Nova Scotia, would “simply
perpetuate the existing situation.”124 An opt-out regime ensures
protection of the vulnerable party, or, at the very least, ensures that both
parties must agree to avoid such obligations. That is, “only an opt-out
scheme would ensure protection in the absence of positive action by
the parties.”125 The gap between marriage and cohabitation has
narrowed over the past fifty years. Cohabitation is a new form of family
living that should be recognized by policymakers. These policy
concerns all suggest that an opt-out approach is preferable for future
reform in Ontario.
The question now is how the term “spouse” would be defined
in this new approach in Ontario. The definition of spouse included in
British Columbia’s Family Law Act provides a strong framework and
a good starting point. The three-year mark in a cohabiting relationship
seems to be of great significance. “Social science evidence indicates
that less than half of cohabiting relationships reach this point.”126 In
fact, approximately one-third will marry and another quarter will
separate within this time period.127 A three-year threshold will
therefore provide reasonable grounds to believe that the “trial period”
has passed.128 Alternatively, and more accurately, this three-year mark
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can be defined as the point in time in which the community views the
cohabiting couple as a “family.” This is unless, of course, the
cohabiting couple have children together prior to this time, thereby
causing such legal rights and obligations to be extended at an earlier
date. Accordingly, I propose the following definition of spouse:
1(1) In this Act,
“spouse” means either of two persons who
(a) are married to each other,
(b) have together entered into a marriage that is
voidable or void, in good faith on the part of a
person relying on this clause to assert any right,
or
(c) have lived together in a marriage-like
relationship, and
i. have done so for a continuous period of at
least 3 years, or
ii. except in Part 1 [Family Property], have a
child together.
TESTING THE NEW APPROACH: THE EFFECT OF
REFORM ON NEVER-MARRIED AND POST-MARITAL
COHABITANTS
It is important to test the proposed definition of spouse to ensure that it
establishes a fair regime and strikes the appropriate balance between
autonomy and the protection of the vulnerable. Given the statistics
discussed earlier, for the purposes of this paper the effects of the
proposed reform will be analyzed in the context of four different
cohabiting relationships: (1) never-married cohabitants without
children; (2) never-married cohabitants with a mutual child; (3) postmarital cohabitants without children; (4) post-marital cohabitants who
have brought children into the relationship. Two groups have not been
included for the purposes of this paper—never-married cohabitants
who have brought children into the relationship, and post-marital
cohabitants with a mutual child. The former is uncommon and the
effect of reform will be similar to that on group 4. The inclusion of the
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latter would be redundant as the effect of reform would be identical to
the effect on group 2. The possibility of having both a mutual child and
a child brought into the relationship will not be considered, as the
existence of a mutual child is viewed as determinative.
Group 1: Never-married Cohabitants without Children
This situation creates the greatest amount of concern for the opt-out
approach suggested above. This relationship may be the least
permanent of the four groups in consideration and the period of
cohabitation may have the greatest chance of being conceived as a
“trial marriage.” Furthermore, the cohabitants may have the greatest
chance of being unfamiliar with the law and the legal obligations and
rights that would automatically attach upon reaching the three-year
mark. One may suggest that an opt-in approach may be best suited for
this group of cohabitants. The three-year mark, however, prevents the
net from being cast too far.
The similarities between cohabitants and married persons only
becomes stronger with the passage of time. The intentions of
cohabitants may change over the duration of their relationship.
Furthermore, a dependency may develop over time. This is why an optout approach appropriately prevents such vulnerabilities from being
left unprotected. An opt-out approach considers the needs at the end of
a relationship more important than the intentions at the beginning.
Never-married cohabitants without children will fall within the
definition of spouse only if either (a) they choose to marry, or (b) they
continue to cohabit for more than three years. It is at this three-year
mark that the law would deem never-married cohabitants without
children to be living as a family even though they remain unmarried.
The consequences of not adopting such an approach appear to be much
more severe than the consequences of adopting this approach. If both
of the cohabitants wish to avoid such obligations, they are free to
contract out of such a regime. Not much is lost by providing protection
for a vulnerable party, especially starting from the presumption that the
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unaware public believes after three years they are considered to be
married according to the law.
Group 2: Never-married Cohabitants with a Mutual Child
The purpose of an opt-out approach is to appropriately recognize the
diversity of family forms. Ontario’s Family Law Act intends to provide
a legal regime for individuals to consider when structuring their
significant relationships. There is no better an indicator of a family than
the presence of a mutual child. That is, “one of the strongest indicia of
an intention to be treated as a family is the existence of children born
to the couple.”129 Thus, it is a fair presumption that those who cohabit
and have a child together intend to appear as, and wish to be treated as,
a family.
A power imbalance is likely to exist in a situation where nevermarried cohabitants have a child together. A balance must be struck
between the wishes of a party to avoid obligations under the Family
Law Act and equality. This begs the question of what equality actually
means in the context of a family. One possible explanation is that
equality within the family begins from the presumption that the
spouses have contributed equally to the family. The dissolution of an
intact family unit often unmasks the existence of dependency. Without
the presumption of equal contribution, the dependent party is
vulnerable and often exploited.
The Supreme Court of Canada took judicial notice of the
phenomenon of the “feminization of poverty” for post-separation
women and children.130 There is no reason to suggest that this
phenomenon applies only to married women. In fact, scholars have
found that the end of a marriage or a common-law relationship
increases the likelihood of poverty, especially when children are
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involved.131 This group of cohabitants is best served and protected by
an opt-out approach.
Group 3: Post-marital Cohabitants without Children
Post-marital cohabitants are the most likely to be familiar with their
rights and obligations that arise from Ontario’s Family Law Act.
Accordingly, this group of individuals can appropriately structure their
relationships in a manner that is consistent with their intentions. These
unmarried couples may contract out of the obligations that arise at the
three-year mark if they wish to do so.
The idea that not everyone has a choice about whether or not
to marry may be most applicable to this group of cohabitants. This is
because a cohabitant may refuse to marry because of their previous
marital experience. Vulnerability is maximized in an opt-in regime
whereby a couple remains together even though one spouse wishes to
marry and the other refuses to. The suggested opt-out approach
overcomes this issue by appropriately placing the onus on the more
powerful party. At the very least, an opt-out approach provides the
financially vulnerable spouse with more bargaining power.
Group 4: Post-marital Cohabitants Who Have Brought Children
into the Relationship
This group of cohabitants is the most complex of the four because of
the existence of “two families” in one household. That is, at least one
of the cohabitants is a part of two families. The question then becomes
whose interests should the approach protect: the current or former
family. In considering this question, policymakers must balance not
only autonomy and equality but also the interests of the children
brought into the relationship and those of the financially vulnerable
spouse.
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Children are among the most vulnerable individuals within
Canadian society. Thus, balancing the interests of the children and the
vulnerable spouse is a difficult task. One possible resolution is to
provide the courts with a great deal of discretion when there are
children brought into the relationship. This, however, adds a layer of
complexity to the law and would make the law more difficult to
navigate. Furthermore, giving the courts such discretion creates some
sense of unpredictability in the law. Thus, if one of the cohabitants
brings children into the relationship and wishes to protect their
interests, the onus should rest on that individual to structure their
relationship accordingly. A cohabitation agreement would provide
sufficient protection for the interests of the children brought into the
relationship.
CONCLUSION
Marriage may no longer enjoy a “uniquely privileged status” in
Ontario. The social perception of what constitutes a family has changed
over the past fifty years with the emergence of cohabitation. This
marked departure from the traditional perception of the family and
legislative reform are necessary due to the misconception that marriage
ought to be synonymous with family and the lack of security provided
to the vulnerable parties in a cohabiting relationship. While marriage
may signify the formation of a family, married spouses and their
children are only one variation of the nuclear family. Defined as the
basic social unit composed of two parents and their children, the
nuclear family need not be confined to married spouses but should also
include those who choose to cohabit.
The functional similarity between marriage and cohabitation is
one of the main pillars supporting the argument for legislative reform.
Legislative reform has already taken place in many of Canada’s other
provinces. The family must be redefined in order to reflect changes that
have occurred to the family over the past fifty years and the new
variations on the nuclear family. Moreover, this redefinition must be
reflected in family law policy and the Family Law Act.
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One of the many purposes of the law is to regulate social
behaviour and create a framework within which individuals may
structure their relationships. The steady rise in the rate of cohabitation
indicates that cohabitation poses a greater threat to the institution of
marriage than the high incidence of divorce.132 Without reform,
cohabitants are left without clear direction as to their legal rights and
obligations under Ontario’s Family Law Act. An opt-out regime
eliminates the guesswork that exists currently.
When crafting the new legislation, the Ontario government
should consider the recent reform in British Columbia. Furthermore,
policymakers should acknowledge social science evidence and the
work of legal scholars. Although Nova Scotia chose to adopt an opt-in
regime, it is important to pay close attention to the findings of the Law
Reform Commission of Nova Scotia in their Final Report: Reform of
the Law Dealing with Matrimonial Property in Nova Scotia.133 The
amalgamation of all this information leads to the simple conclusion that
an opt-out regime is preferable.
An opt-out approach also finds an effective balance between
the competing values of autonomy and equality entrenched in the
Charter. By adopting the expanded definition of “spouse” and the
three-year benchmark for cohabitants, an opt-out approach provides
cohabitants with much-needed certainty, predictability, fairness, and
consistency in the law. Through their inclusion in the property sharing
regime, cohabitants would no longer have to resort to navigating the
minefield of equitable claims. Instead, an opt-out approach
appropriately places the burden on the more powerful party, thereby
providing the vulnerable party with more bargaining power.
Lastly, it is important to educate the public about such reform
if it is to take place. This will ease the transition into the new regime
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by allowing cohabitants to become accustomed to their new legal rights
and obligations. Familiarity with such reform also has the effect of
minimizing exploitation and vulnerability. This reform will
appropriately address the most relevant question in family law—who
is a family—and recognize that the modern family is no longer limited
to those who marry.

